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Abstract: We describe the medium-run macroeconomic effects and long-run development consequences 
of a financial Dutch disease that may take place in a small developing country with abundant natural 
resources. The first move is in financial markets. An initial surge in foreign direct investment targeting 
natural resources sets in motion a perverse cycle between exchange rate appreciation and mounting short- 
and medium-term capital flows. Such a spiral easily leads to exchange rate volatility, capital reversals, and 
sharp macroeconomic instability. In the long run, macroeconomic instability and overdependence on 
natural resource exports dampen the development of nontraditional tradable goods sectors and curtail labor 
productivity dynamics.  We advise the introduction of constraints to short- and medium-term capital flows 
to tame exchange rate/capital flows boom-and-bust cycles. We support the implementation of a 
developmentalist monetary policy targeting competitive nominal and real exchange rates in order to 
encourage product and export diversification. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the last two decades, widespread consensus has been reached that the liberalization of financial 
markets and free capital movements are major causes of macroeconomic volatility and 
vulnerability (Krugman 1999; Stiglitz 2002; Gallagher, Griffith-Jones, and Ocampo 2012). 
Economists mainly focus on portfolio investment when they investigate these issues, highlighting 
its short-term horizon and quick reversibility. On the contrary, foreign direct investment (FDI) is 
usually positively considered: in the case of developing countries, for instance, it is believed to 
contribute to domestic capital formation and enhance labor productivity through the “import” of 
more advanced technologies.  
However, this view on FDIs as a source of long-run progress is not unanimous. FDI’s 
effects depend on the way they integrate into the productive system of the recipient economy, 
hence on their real contribution to domestic capital accumulation and technological knowledge 
(Lall 2000; Singh 2003). In this sense, the sectorial pattern of incoming FDI is likely to be a 
decisive factor (Dutt 1997): FDIs in the natural resource sector are rather different from those 
targeting domestic manufacturing. The former usually regards separate enclaves within the 
productive system of the host economy and is very likely to increase its dependence on the export 
of natural resources, thus possibly exacerbating Dutch disease effects. On the other hand, FDIs in 
the manufacturing sector exhibit a higher potential in terms of long-term growth with the creation 
and diffusion of technological progress.  
The literature on the Dutch disease usually describes it as a real-side phenomenon whose 
causes lie on the real side of the economy. In other words, natural resource booms or huge 
international aid flows tend to increase domestic expenditure and alter domestic relative prices in 
favor of non-tradable goods. Such appreciation of the real exchange rate negatively impacts on 
the development of non-traditional tradable sectors, reducing their profitability and 
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competitiveness. A deindustrialization process is likely to eventually take place, possibly 
curtailing long-run growth potential (Sachs and Warner 1995 2001; Ros 2001). In a way, 
traditional Dutch disease models emerge as real-side models that overlook the monetary 
implications of natural resource booms, i.e., the effects they may trigger on the external balance 
and financial solidity of the economies under observation (see Corden and Neary 1982). We think 
this is a relevant shortcoming. First, the lack of a precise national account framework in most 
Dutch disease models does not enable them to consider the possibility that natural resource booms 
might influence the economic dynamics by feeding the excessive accumulation of foreign 
liabilities and giving rise to boom-and-bust cycles.1 This hypothesis was originally put forward by 
Manzano and Rigobon (2001) in their econometric work on the economic performance of natural-
resource-abundant countries in 1970s and 1980s. Second, when natural resource booms lead to 
mounting FDI inflows, the financial sphere of an economy is affected through a change in the 
external net investment position. According to Singh (2003), these effects cannot be neglected, 
since “FDI creates foreign exchange liabilities not only now but also into the future [so that] 
unfettered FDI may create a time profile of foreign exchange outflows and inflows which may be 
time inconsistent” (Singh 2003, 209). 
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the literature on the Dutch disease and the effects 
of natural-resource-based FDI on the economic dynamics of developing countries. Unlike previous 
Dutch disease models, we primarily consider how natural-resource-based FDI may affect the 
macroeconomic stability of recipient economies and we elaborate and introduce the concept of 
financial Dutch disease.  FDIs targeting developing countries’ natural resources directly affect 
their productive structure (and consequently their growth potential), but also affect their external 
balance equilibrium. In a flexible exchange rate regime, for instance, long-term FDIs may induce 
                                                          
1 Standard Dutch disease models formalize external imbalances into perfect-foresight infinite-lifetime frameworks. Accordingly, 
external borrowing and rising foreign debt today are fully repaid by increasing domestic savings and rising current account 
surpluses tomorrow (see Bruno and Sachs 1982; Mansoorian 1991; Ojeda et al. 2014). In these models, boom-and-bust cycles and 
possible episodes of foreign debt overhang are avoided by assumption. 
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the exchange rate to appreciate. Exchange rate appreciation, which is first nominal and then real, 
may attract additional portfolio investment by reducing perceived country risks or increasing 
capital gains expectations. Portfolio capital inflows in turn feed back on exchange rate dynamics 
and may lead to an even stronger appreciation.  
Two undesirable scenarios may possibly arise from this process. First, exchange rate 
appreciation impinges on the profitability of domestic manufacturing, reduces its external 
competitiveness, and likely leads it to shrink with respect to the natural resource sector. This 
corresponds to what is usually claimed by traditional Dutch disease models, even though in this 
paper it will be determined by financial and monetary—say nominal—mechanisms rather than 
real-side ones. Second, and perhaps more relevantly, the aforementioned economic spiral may 
abruptly reverse if economic agents evaluate the accumulation of foreign debt and the exchange 
rate appreciation as being unsustainable processes. The ensuing quick capital reversals, the 
collapse of the exchange rate, and macroeconomic instability represent may jeopardize the long-
run growth potential—and the development of the manufacturing sector in particular—since 
productive investment in the real business sector is usually highly sensitive to boom-and-bust 
cycles. To sum up, these phenomena all originate in the financial markets as a consequence of FDI 
inflows. An apparently traditional Dutch disease actually develops through rather unusual 
mechanisms that are mainly connected to the overall external soundness of an economy. This is 
why we label it a financial Dutch disease.2  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the macroeconomic characteristics 
of the financial Dutch disease. Section 3 shows how such macroeconomic dynamics can affect the 
sectorial composition of an economy and thus the overall labor productivity dynamics. Section 4 
                                                          
2 In a way, this paper provides a formal representation of what Ocampo (2013) defines a “Balance of Payments dominance” regime, 
i.e., a macroeconomic framework in which macroeconomic dynamics is determined by external shocks, boom-and-bust cycles in 
external financing in particular. The kind of shock we have in mind is an initial surge in FDIs targeting developing countries’ 
natural resources. 
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concludes by outlining some policy implications in order to deal with FDI flows, macroeconomic 
volatility, and the long-run growth potential of a developing country. 
 
2. The Macroeconomics of a financial Dutch disease 
 
This article is a spin-off a previous publication on macroeconomic dynamics in current day 
Colombia following the booming FDI inflows in the domestic oil sector (Botta, Godin, and 
Missaglia 2014). This work goes beyond the specific Colombian case and tries to provide a more 
general theoretical framework. More precisely, we intend to analyze the case of small open 
developing economies exhibiting three characteristics. 
 First, the economy has a significant endowment of natural resources and consequently 
attracts a huge amount of FDIs. Second, the economy is open to free trade and free capital 
movements. The primary objective of macroeconomic policy is price stability and monetary policy 
is implemented via inflation targeting (Masson et al. 1997; Minshkin 2000; Gemayel et al. 2011).3 
Third, consistent with an inflation-targeting monetary policy, the nominal exchange rate is free to 
float (Masson et al. 1997; Mishkin 2000; Epstein and Yeldan 2009). The domestic central bank 
can intervene to manage exchange rate dynamics (or takes it into account in defining its benchmark 
interest rate) in order to achieve the inflation target (Edwards 2006). Central bank intervention is 
promptly implemented in the event of exchange rate depreciation that may put domestic price 
stability at risk, increasing “imported” inflation. Much less concern exists in case of appreciation 
trends that increase domestic purchasing power and reduce inflationist pressures.4 
                                                          
3 Masson et al. (1997) and Mishkin (2000) list a series of institutional developments that are considered fundamental prerequisites 
in order to make inflation targeting effective and credible in developing countries. Emphasis is put on the introduction of an 
independent and accountable central bank, the removal of fiscal dominance, and the development of a deep and free financial sector 
(intended as a side product of fiscal dominance’s removal). 
4 See Galindo and Ros (2006) on the asymmetric response of Mexican monetary authorities to exchange rate appreciation and 
depreciation. Mohanty and Klau (2005) provide evidence about monetary policy’s asymmetric responses to inflation shocks 
(tougher against positive shocks than against negative ones) for a larger sample of emerging economies. Interestingly, Pontines 
and Siregar (2012) find a stronger response of domestic central banks against appreciation rather than depreciation in the case of 
Indonesia, South Korea, Philippines, and Malaysia from 2000 to 2006. After the East Asian crisis at the end of the 1990s, even in 
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Finally, both long-term FDI and short/medium-term portfolio investment are allowed. For the sake 
of simplicity, we assume FDIs to concentrate only in the domestic natural resource sector. Portfolio 
investment mainly takes the form of short-term/medium-term foreign debt (denominated in foreign 
currency), namely bills or financial loans.5 Equities are not considered, but such   simplification 
does not modify the logic of our model and the economic mechanisms we are investigating.  
The model consists of two non-linear differential equations. In chapter 10 of 
“Reconstructing Macroeconomics,” Lance Taylor (2004a) develops a model of financial cycles in 
developing countries. He assumes a fixed exchange rate regime and describes the dynamics of 
foreign reserves as resulting from surpluses or deficits in the sum of the current and financial 
account of the balance of payments (BoPs). In this paper we present the “flexible exchange rate 
version” of that external balance equation. The exchange rate dynamics (rather than the variation 
in foreign reserves) are now the endogenous outcome of the interactions among the various 
components of the BoP:  
 
?̇? = 𝑒 {[𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑀(𝑒) −
𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑀(𝑒)
𝑒
] − 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑁𝑅 + 𝑖𝐻𝐷 + 𝜋𝑁𝑅 + ?̇? − 𝐾𝐴𝑃𝐼(𝑖𝐻 − 𝑖𝐹 − 𝜎(𝑒, 𝐷)) − 𝐾𝐴𝐹𝐷𝐼(𝑁)}        (1) 
 
Following Taylor (2004b), equation (1) does not show the traditional Mundell-Fleming dichotomy 
between a flexible exchange rate and endogenous foreign reserves as adjusting variables for short-
run external imbalances. In fact, equation (1) does not determine any instantaneous equilibrium 
level of the exchange rate e, but simply takes into account all the possible factors included in the 
BoPs, i.e., trade flows, net income transfers, and financial flows that may give rise to an excess of 
demand or supply for the domestic currency on the currency market.  
                                                          
the (formal) context of an inflation targeting monetary policy, these countries have paid attention to maintaining a competitive 
nominal and real exchange rate in order to avoid current account deficits.  
5 See Mishkin (1999), Taylor (1998), Neftci (1998), and Frenkel and Rapetti (2009) on the short-term structure of foreign liabilities 
of domestic agents, financial intermediaries in particular, in the emerging economies affected by financial and currency crises in 
1990s.  
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Equation (1), for instance, shows that exchange rate dynamics are strongly influenced by, among 
other factors, interest rate differentials and country-factor risk premia, which modify portfolio 
income decisions—and thus net portfolio capital flows—hence determining changes and perhaps 
temporary trends in the exchange rate dynamics ?̇?. In broader terms, equation (1) formalizes 
massive capital inflows and then reversals that, following Frenkel and Rapetti (2009), have 
repeatedly led to strong exchange rate appreciation and abrupt collapses in many developing 
countries and emerging economies. Within this framework, foreign reserves turn out to be the 
exogenous policy instrument in the hands of domestic monetary authorities, through which they 
may try to tame or even reverse pressures on exchange rate appreciation6 or control exchange rate 
devaluations and avoid collapses in presence of mounting capital outflows (insofar as reserves are 
available). 
Equation (1) distinguishes between imports and exports of manufactured goods as 
expressed in foreign currency, impM and (expM/e), respectively; foreign currency-denominated 
exports of domestic natural resources expNR, such as oil; interest payments on foreign debt iHD; 
foreign firms’ profit repatriation out of natural resource revenues 𝜋𝑁𝑅; domestic central bank’s 
variations of foreign reserves ?̇?; net portfolio capital inflows KAPI; and net FDI KAFDI. We assume 
that foreign firms’ profit repatriation 𝜋𝑁𝑅 is a constant share α of natural resource exports expNR. 
As far as manufactured goods are concerned, their imports are denominated in foreign currency 
and negatively respond to nominal exchange rate depreciation (i.e., higher e values), whereas their 
exports are denominated in domestic currency and positively respond to such the depreciation of 
e.  Actually, manufactured goods imports and exports, as well as the viability of non-traditional 
tradable good sectors, are also affected by relative price dynamics among trading partners, and 
therefore by the real exchange rate dynamics rather then by the nominal one only. However, 
relative price dynamics may prove of secondary importance in this model. First, the financial 
                                                          
6 This is the case of many East Asian countries and China when, in the case of large surpluses in their external accounts, they keep 
their exchange rate devaluated by piling up a huge amount of foreign reserves.  
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Dutch disease we describe mainly affects the nominal exchange rate set on the currency market 
rather than the real one through changes in relative prices.7 Second, inflation-targeting monetary 
policy can at least partially restrain inflation lifts, due to abundant capital inflows. Relative 
inflation rate dynamics among trading partners may be of minor concern with respect to what has 
been observed in the recent past in presence of fixed exchange rate regimes. Third, developing 
countries’ inflation, if relevant, may easily reach higher levels than those observed in foreign 
economies—developed ones in particular. 8 The inclusion in our model of relative price changes 
would simply reinforce the kind of dynamics we already illustrated. For the sake of simplicity, we 
choose not to focus on relative price dynamics. 
We assume that portfolio investment usually takes the form of foreign-currency-
denominated short-term bills or loans. Accordingly, foreign lenders do not bear any direct 
exchange rate risk. The amount of net portfolio capital inflows is simply determined by the interest 
rate differential (iH – iF) – iH and iF, respectively being the domestic and foreign interest rate9—
and by the country-factor risk σ. Yet, portfolio net capital flows are related to exchange rate 
dynamics through the lender-borrower default risk. The more appreciated the domestic exchange 
rate (i.e., low e values) the more domestic borrowers’ financial position will be sound and the more 
easily domestic borrowers will meet their payment commitments in foreign currency. It follows 
that the country-factor risk will decrease and portfolio investment increases. In the same vein, a 
depreciation of the exchange rate will make the foreign debt burden less sustainable and domestic 
borrowers’ default risk higher. In this case, the ensuing increase in the country-risk factor σ will 
curtail (and perhaps reverse) net portfolio capital flows. Therefore, the domestic exchange rate and 
short-term portfolio capital flows are connected by an indirect relationship.10 
                                                          
7 Goda and Torres (2013) provide empirical evidence supporting such interpretation of the Dutch disease episode currently 
underway in Colombia. 
8 See Frenkel and Rapetti (2009) on the ensuing real exchange rate appreciation experienced by many developing countries after 
capital account liberalization. 
9 We assume the domestic interest rate iH to be an exogenous policy variable managed by the domestic central bank in order to 
achieve its inflation target.  
10 Such an assumption likely holds true, even in the case of equity holding as an alternative investment option with respect to bills 
or loans. Exchange rate appreciation may in fact increase expected capital gains on domestic equities and stimulate portfolio 
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Net FDI KAFDI is assumed not to depend on the exchange rate, since it targets domestic natural 
resources that are exported on international markets and sold in foreign currency. It is positively 
influenced by the available stock of domestic natural resources N.  
Equation (2) makes explicit our assumption of net portfolio capital flows mainly consisting of 
short- and medium-term bills or financial loans, thus representing foreign debt variations: 
 
?̇? = 𝐾𝐴𝑃𝐼(𝑖𝐻 − 𝑖𝐹 − 𝜎(𝑒, 𝐷))                    (2) 
 
With (𝜕𝐾𝐴𝑃𝐼 𝜕𝜎)⁄ < 0; (𝜕𝜎 𝜕𝑒⁄ ) > 0; (𝜕𝜎 𝜕𝐷)⁄ > 0  
 
Equation (2) also states a reasonable negative relationship between the current level of foreign 
indebtedness D and its own dynamics. The higher the foreign debt stock is, the less likely foreign 
lenders are to increase their exposition towards domestic economic agents by providing new credit. 
Therefore, there exists a negative relationship between D and ?̇?. It implies self-stabilizing 
dynamics take place as to the accumulation of foreign debt.        
Whilst most of the partial derivatives’ signs are clear in equation (2), something more must 
be said about stable/unstable exchange rate dynamics. Deriving equation (1) with respect to the 
current exchange rate in the neighborhood of the steady state and after some mathematical 
passages, we get: 
 
𝜕?̇?
𝜕𝑒
|
?̇?=0
=
𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑀
𝑒
{𝜂𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑀
𝑒 𝜒 − 𝜂𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑀
𝑒 + 1} − 𝑒
𝜕𝐾𝐴𝑃𝐼
𝜕𝜎
𝜕𝜎
𝜕𝑒
                  (3) 
 
                                                          
investment to come in and flood the economy. In the end, foreign investment on domestic bills, equities, and the provision of loans 
may all co-move. They may strongly increase in times of financial euphoria and suddenly dry up when signs of deep external 
imbalances emerge.  
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With 𝜒 =
𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑀
(𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑀 𝑒⁄ )
 as the manufacturing import-export ratio; 𝑒
(𝜕𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑀(𝑒)/𝜕𝑒)
𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑀
= 𝜂𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑀
𝑒  and 
𝑒
(𝜕𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑀(𝑒)/𝜕𝑒)
𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑀
= 𝜂𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑀
𝑒  as manufactured good import and export elasticities to the exchange rate. 
 
The above equation (3) defines the negative or positive effect that an exchange rate shift may have 
on its own dynamics. The first part of equation (3) is the well-known Marshall-Learner-Robinson 
condition in the case of an initial (manufacturing) trade imbalance. The last decades have been 
characterized by widespread financial deregulation, which has made financial transactions 
overwhelmingly relevant in explaining exchange rate dynamics. Correspondingly, the second part 
of equation (3) takes into account how an exchange rate shift may affect net capital flows, portfolio 
investment in particular. The sign of equation (3) can be either negative (a depreciated current 
exchange rate tames further depreciation) or positive (unstable feedbacks in the exchange rate 
dynamics). In this regard, the more liberalized the capital account is, the more intensively capital 
movements will respond to exchange rate shifts. This fact might outstrip possible stabilizing 
effects passing through trade flows and give rise to exchange rate instability. In the rest of the 
paper we assume the unstable scenario to apply. 
The effect of a higher foreign debt stock D on the exchange rate dynamics is clearly 
positive. A higher debt stock induces the nominal exchange rate to depreciate faster. First, an 
increase in D will lead foreign lenders to be more skeptical about new credit lines granted to the 
home economy, so that (𝜕𝜎 𝜕𝐷) > 0⁄ . Portfolio investment, as well as the demand for domestic 
currency, might decrease. Second, higher debt stocks imply tougher debt burdens and heavier 
interest payments. The demand for foreign currency will increase and the domestic exchange rate 
will depreciate. The positive link between D and ?̇? is formally stated in the derivative below: 
 
𝜕?̇?
𝜕𝐷
|
?̇?=0
= 𝑒𝑖𝐻 − 𝑒
𝜕𝑊𝐴𝑃𝐼
𝜕𝜎
𝜕𝜎
𝜕𝐷
> 0    
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2.1 The Joint Macroeconomic Dynamics of the Exchange Rate and Foreign Debt 
Stock 
  
According to the economic relationships encapsulated in equations (1) and (2), dynamics in the 
exchange rate and foreign debt stock can be described according to the Jacobian matrix J: 
𝐽 =
?̇?
?̇?
    
𝑒 𝐷
[
+ +
− −
] 
The signs of partial derivatives in matrix J reveal that both geometric loci for constant values of e 
and D slope downward. Should the (?̇? = 0) locus be steeper than the locus for (?̇? = 0), the system 
will be unstable. On the contrary, a substantially flat locus for (?̇? = 0), in particular flatter than 
the isocline for (?̇? = 0), will open space to stability. A focus will emerge. Cyclical fluctuations 
around the equilibrium point will be stable and convergent to equilibrium should the Jacobian 
matrix’s trace tr.(J) be negative. If the matrix’s trace is positive, diverging cycles will take place. 
[Figure 1] 
 
Possible converging fluctuations characterizing such economic system are portrayed in figure 1. 
If an economy initially lies in point C, its external account will register a surplus. Therefore, ?̇? will 
be negative and the nominal exchange rate will appreciate. A decreasing domestic borrower’s risk 
(or the possibility of capital gains on the domestic equity market) will induce foreign portfolio 
investment to flow in. A foreign credit boom likely takes place and foreign debt increases.11 The 
exchange rate appreciates even further, jeopardizing home economy manufacturing exports, 
favoring imports, and leading to a wider manufactured good trade deficit. Once the trajectory of 
                                                          
11 In Colombia, the initial surge in FDIs has been more recently followed by positive and increasing net foreign portfolio investment. 
In the first half of the 2000s, portfolio investment in Colombia was close to zero or even negative. Since 2007—with the only 
exception of 2008—it has exhibited positive values. From 2011 to 2013, according to data provided by the Central Bank of 
Colombia, it amounted to more than $5.5 billion yearly, more than 1.5% of Colombian GDP. In the first quarter of 2014, it stood 
at more than $2.5 billion. 
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the economy crosses the isocline for (?̇? = 0), an external account deficit occurs; ?̇? turns into 
positive and the exchange rate starts depreciating, even though short-/medium-term portfolio 
investment continues to flow in at least for a brief period. Sudden stops, capital reversals, and 
exchange rate collapses eventually take place once the economy’s trajectory passes the isocline 
for (?̇? = 0). Face to a depreciating exchange rate and an excessively high foreign debt stock, 
foreign investors will fear that domestic borrowers will not honor their payment commitments. 
External financial support rapidly dries up and external debt/exchange rate twin crises break out, 
with harsh effects on the real side of the economy.12  
 
2.2 A Natural Resource-FDI Boom 
 
Let us assume now that new natural resources are discovered. This fact likely leads to a spike in 
net FDI targeting domestic natural resources, so that WAFDI increases. From a graphical point of 
view, the isocline for (?̇? = 0) shifts rightwards, as shown in figure 2. A new equilibrium point B 
emerges. Cases of cyclical dynamics like those described in figure 1 will, in turn, affect an 
economic system originally located in the initial equilibrium A.  
      The exchange rate will first appreciate and attract additional short-/medium-term portfolio 
investment. Positive FDI, portfolio investment, and the increasing export flows of natural 
resources contribute to crowd out manufactured goods exports and give rise to a widening 
manufacturing trade deficit, with significantly appreciated nominal and real exchange rates. 
However, the appreciation of the domestic currency and the attraction of foreign portfolio 
investment do not last long. The widening manufacturing trade gap and foreign firms’ profit 
                                                          
12 Mishkin (2000, 6) is well aware that, in presence of high capital mobility and of an inflation-targeting monetary policy, higher 
exchange rate volatility may seriously put at risk the financial solidity of the domestic economy. He stresses that “in many emerging 
market countries the balance sheets of firms, households and banks are substantially dollarized […] Since inflation targeting 
necessarily requires nominal exchange rate flexibility, exchange rate fluctuations are unavoidable. However, a large and abrupt 
depreciation may increase the burden of dollar-denominated debt and produce a massive deterioration of the balance sheets, 
increasing the risks of a financial crisis.”  
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repatriations (partially compensating for the increase in natural resource exports) will sooner or 
later lead to an overall external deficit and downward pressures on domestic currency (i.e., a 
positive value of ?̇?). The turning point in the exchange rate dynamics can take place even before 
if FDIs decrease in a few years due to the progressive exhaustion of domestic natural resources [in 
figure 2, the locus for (?̇? = 0) will partially move back to the original position]. 
[Figure 2] 
 
Regardless of the converging or diverging nature of such economic dynamics, it is clear that an 
initial surge in FDI may eventually ignite boom-and-bust cycles. Exchange rate volatility and 
quick capital reversals may in turn determine the disruption of economic activity, and perhaps lead 
to a protracted period of economic stagnation if the domestic financial sector is severely hurt by 
these turbulences.  
Following Rodrik (2007), both exchange rate appreciation and exchange rate volatility 
undermine the development of non-traditional tradable sectors. Manufacturing production, exports 
and, above all, investment decisions are often planned in advance on a long-run time horizon. 
Uncertainty emerging from the above fluctuations can discourage entrepreneurs from 
implementing new production processes and undertaking investment projects whose profitability 
cannot be assessed on sufficiently solid bases. FDI targeting developing countries’ natural 
resources may eventually negatively affect manufacturing and the overall development process in 
three ways. First, they may induce a direct negative effect by shifting the domestic productive 
structure away from manufacturing towards a deeper dependence on natural resources. Second, 
higher natural resource exports may determine a secular long-run appreciation of the domestic 
currency, thus making domestic manufacturing less competitive, profitable, and viable. Third, 
manufacturing development may be even further hindered by the uncertainty associated with 
macroeconomic fluctuations generated by perverse feedbacks between FDI, exchange rate 
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appreciation, and short/medium-term portfolio capital movements. Policymakers should seriously 
pay attention to the medium-run and long-run effects of such a financial Dutch disease. 
 
3. Long-run Consequences of the Financial Dutch Disease 
 
In the previous section, we discussed that macroeconomic volatility and vulnerability 
characterizing what we called financial Dutch disease. The first move is on financial markets and 
takes the form of huge FDI inflows targeting domestic natural resources. Exchange rate 
appreciation, also due to increasing natural resource exports, follows closely and interacts with 
short-/medium-run capital movements into a perverse spiral eventually undermining long-run 
manufacturing development. Let us now focus more in detail on the possible long-run 
consequences of such dynamics. 
Our analysis rests on the well-known literature attributing specific growth-enhancing 
properties to manufacturing. This standpoint dates back to the 1960s and to the theoretical 
contributions by Nicholas Kaldor. More recently, this perspective has been formally reinterpreted 
in several models on the natural resource curse (see Sachs and Warner 1995 and 2001; Ros 2001). 
From an empirical point of view, Imbs and Warzciag (2003) and Klinger and Lederman (2004) 
note that the development process significantly hinges on the diversification of a country’s 
productive structure. Manufacturing provides more opportunities than other sectors in terms of 
innovation and enlargement of the production space. Consequently, manufacturing development 
represents a “positive” structural change that feeds growth (Rodrik 2009; McMillan and Rodrik 
2011) and may prove to be the engine of economic take off (Rajan and Subramanian 2011), 
providing the basis for productive and export activities of non-traditional tradable goods. Even 
though manufacturing may play a less relevant role for economic growth in the era of the digital 
economy than in the “golden age” of capitalism, it may still represent a leading factor in the growth 
process of developing countries (Lavopa and Szirmai 2012).  
 [16] 
 
In order to further clarify this point, equation (4) formalizes in the simplest way possible some of 
the factors affecting manufacturing development. Manufacturing development is proxied by 
manufacturing contribution to real GDP: 
 
𝑚 = 𝑓(𝑒, 𝜌, 𝑊𝐴𝑃𝐼 , 𝐾𝑁𝑅)                                    (4) 
 
With (𝜕𝑚 𝜕𝑒) > 0; ⁄ (𝜕𝑚 𝜕𝑊𝐴𝑃𝐼) < 0⁄ ; (𝜕𝑚 𝜕𝐾𝑁𝑅⁄ ) < 0 
 
In equation (4), we first assume that non-resource-based tradable good sectors (as a share of GDP) 
are positively affected by a depreciated exchange rate. This assumption relies on the considerable 
body of literature that defines exchange rate policy as one of the most effective industrial policies 
favoring the expansion of non-traditional tradable sectors versus non-tradable industries, at least 
in the early stages of economic development (Gala 2008; Rodrik 2008a and 2009; Cimoli et al. 
2013). 
Following Rodrik (2007), manufacturing development positively responds to a relatively 
depreciated and stable (real) exchange rate. On the contrary, exchange rate volatility can seriously 
hinder the emergence of new non-traditional tradable industries. In equation (4), ρ stands for a 
measure of exchange rate volatility, namely exchange rate variance. In our model, perverse 
feedbacks between initial FDI flows, short-term portfolio investment, and exchange rate dynamics 
may give rise to exchange rate fluctuations, hence increasing ρ values. On top of the initial 
appreciation phase in the exchange rate dynamics, such exchange rate volatility puts further strain 
on domestic manufacturing development.  
In equation (4), we also think about a negative relationship between manufacturing 
development and net portfolio capital inflows. Such an assumption does not depend on any specific 
empirical evidence. Studies have mostly focused on the effects of portfolio capital flows on general 
macroeconomic dynamics and volatility rather than on possible effects on the sectorial 
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composition of the recipient economy. Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to assume that other non-
tradable sectors can benefit from a surge in portfolio foreign investment. This is, for example, the 
case of financial services or the real estate sector that can better exploit chances to get easy access 
to cheap external finance and use it to speculate on domestic financial assets (Taylor 1998).13 
Finally, manufacturing GDP share is negatively affected by the size of the domestic natural 
resources sector, here represented by the capital stock KNR invested in the natural resources 
industry. 
Equation (5) describes the essence of the Kaldorian argument on the pro-growth properties 
characterizing manufacturing. We assume a positive relationship between manufacturing GDP 
share m and the overall labor productivity growth rate yl: 
 
𝑦𝑙 = 𝑔(𝑚)                (5) 
 
With (𝜕𝑦𝑙 𝜕𝑚) > 0⁄  and 𝜕(𝜕𝑦𝑙 𝜕𝑚)/𝜕𝑚 < 0⁄  
 
The long-run development effects of the medium-run dynamics described in the previous part of 
the paper pass through the relationships formalized in equations (4) and (5). These relationships 
are depicted in figure 3.  
In the top-left panel of figure 3, we put in relation those values of the exchange rate e and 
net portfolio capital flows WAPI that keep manufacturing GDP shares constant. According to the 
signs of the partial derivatives’ to equation (4), the locus for constant m values slopes upwards. In 
figure 3, the “mA curve” represents all possible e-WAPI combinations that keep the manufacturing 
GDP share equal to mA, i.e., its initial value in the equilibrium point A. Points below (above) the 
“mA curve” stand for levels of manufacturing development lower (higher) than mA. According to 
                                                          
13 See IMF (2009) on the asymmetric response of service and manufacturing sectors to economic cycles. Service and real estate 
sectors have been relevant sources of employment creation during (perhaps) finance-led expansions since 1970. Manufacturing 
employment has traditionally been the main victim of contractions.   
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equation (4), the position of the map of contour curves for different m values depends on ρ and 
KN. Should ρ and/or KN increase, the isocline for values of m equal to mA will move upwards. 
Given net portfolio flows, a depreciation of the exchange rate must materialize in order to prevent 
the manufacturing contribution to GDP from declining.   
The top-right panel of figure 3 depicts the positive relationship between the exchange rate 
e and m as encapsulated in equation (4). Ultimately, the bottom-left panel of figure 3 reproduces 
the positive link between manufacturing development and the overall labor productivity growth. 
Now let us assume that a natural resources boom attracts new FDIs. The capital stock KNR 
will increase and natural resources production (and exports) expand. Ceteris paribus, this will 
imply a direct contraction of the manufacturing GDP share. In the top-left panel of figure 3, this 
shock is represented by a parallel upward shift of the “mA isocline” (from mA to mA1). 
Apart from this first direct effect, initial FDI sets in motion the cyclical dynamics described 
in section 2. This fact is portrayed in the top-left panel of figure 3 by the black dotted line. The 
economy will move away from the initial equilibrium A and fluctuate around the final equilibrium 
B. Along the cyclical traverse towards the new equilibrium, increasing exchange rate volatility 
will take place (at least with respect to the initial steady state), and ρ will increase in equation (4). 
These exchange rate fluctuations can certainly jeopardize manufacturing development even 
further. In the top-left panel of figure 3, a perverse second-round upward shift in the “mA isocline” 
(from mA
1 to mA
2) will eventually occur.  
[Figure 3] 
 
In point B, net portfolio capital flows are in equilibrium and the foreign debt stock is stable. The 
exchange rate e will be at a lower and more appreciated long-run value than the initial one. Indeed, 
increasing exports of primary commodities on international markets may lead to a long-term 
persistent appreciation of the domestic currency, thus crowding out manufacturing exports. 
Domestic manufacturing will shrink even further. This outcome is in line with the argument 
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originally put forward by Singh (2003, 209), who argues that “FDI surges, as those for example of 
portfolio investment, can lead to equally undesirable consequences such as exchange rate 
appreciation and reduced competitiveness of a country’s tradable sector”  
In the top-right panel of figure 3 we reproduce the long-run contraction of domestic 
manufacturing in the (e-m) space. The leftward movement of the (e-m) curve represents the effects 
on manufacturing development due to both the initial FDI shock and the ensuing exchange rate 
and macroeconomic volatility. The downward movement along the new dashed line from eA to eB 
is the outcome of the long-run exchange rate appreciation. Manufacturing participation to GDP 
eventually drops from mA to mB. 
Consistent with our assumptions, the upward sloping curve in the bottom-left panel of 
figure 3 shows the positive link between manufacturing development and overall labor 
productivity dynamics. It also shows the possible worrisome long-run effects of such a financial 
Dutch disease. FDIs in natural resource sectors, unstable portfolio capital flows, and a permanent 
exchange rate appreciation may eventually lead to a permanent slowdown in the growth rate of 
labor productivity and in the pace of economic development.   
 
4. Policy Options 
 
The long-run negative effects on labor productivity dynamics due to such a financial Dutch disease 
are not automatic. First, these effects depend on how FDI integrates with the rest of the domestic 
productive system, which in turn depends, at least partially, on the industrial policy implemented 
by domestic authorities. Second, exchange rate volatility and financial turbulences might be tamed 
through specific measures adopted by monetary and fiscal institutions. In both cases, domestic 
authorities may be expected to intervene in order to neutralize the perverse medium- and long-run 
outcomes outlined above. 
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The kind of policies used in tackling the Dutch disease depends on the specific mechanisms 
through which the phenomenon develops. The OECD (2013), for instance, recognizes the 
existence of an ongoing deindustrialization process in Colombia and describes it using standard 
real-side Dutch disease models. In accordance, the OECD recommends a set of restrictive fiscal 
and monetary policies in order to tame possible perverse effects of the ongoing natural resource-
FDI boom. The OECD first claims that in moments of economic bonanza restrictive fiscal policies 
may help to reduce inflationist pressures due to higher domestic expenditures, and create a fiscal 
buffer to deploy in the event of future drops in the price of primary commodities. Second, monetary 
policy should focus on price stability, perhaps increasing the target interest rate and (hence) 
indirectly reinforcing the appreciation of the nominal exchange rate to meet its own inflation target. 
Third, in presence of a permanently appreciated market-driven nominal exchange rate, the need to 
maintain a competitive real exchange rate should be pursed via structural measures. The emphasis 
is here on the lifting of restrictive minimum wage regulation and the support of infrastructure 
investment raising overall factor productivity.     
This paper analyzes Dutch disease phenomena, including the Colombian one, under a 
different perspective, as it focuses on financial processes and how Dutch disease can develop 
through channels that are basically overlooked by the standard literature. Therefore, a different set 
of policies should be considered to tackle it. We focus on two specific topics that mainly concern 
macroeconomic policies rather than long-run industrial ones, even though relevant overlaps exist 
between the two types of measures (Rodrik 2008b). The first issue refers to financial flow controls. 
The second one refers to the exchange rate policy implemented by domestic monetary authorities, 
hence on the management of foreign reserves. 
Exchange rate fluctuations and financial turbulences described originate from an initial 
surge in FDI that triggers a vicious spiral between volatile capital flows and exchange rate 
dynamics. The destabilizing effects of short-/medium-term capital flights are clear. This paper 
provides further support to the already existing idea that short-/medium-term foreign portfolio 
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investment should be tightly controlled. In particular, it might be useful to sharply reduce the 
sensitiveness of capital flows to exchange rate changes. On top of possible quantitative restrictions, 
we would take into consideration taxation schemes that target capital gains emerging from the 
appreciation of exchange rate. Taxes on capital gains may first discourage speculation on the 
domestic equity market; second, they may curb domestic agents’ propensity to search for financial 
resources on international markets to deploy on speculative activities on domestic assets. This 
might significantly contribute the reduction of domestic agents’ exposure to foreign debt.  
In order to clarify this point, let us assume that policy intervention is successful is removing 
destabilizing connections between portfolio foreign investment and the exchange rate. The locus 
for (?̇? = 0) gets vertical (see figure 4, below). On top of this, the locus for (?̇? = 0) may turn out to 
be positively sloped. Once we have removed destabilizing forces connecting e to 𝑒 ̇  through boom-
and-bust dynamics in portfolio capital flows, a depreciation of the exchange rate will more easily 
improve the trade balance and the overall balance of payments, provided that the Marshall-
Learner-Robinson condition holds true. In this new framework, FDI targeting domestic natural 
resources will still appreciate the exchange rate, hence undermining the competitiveness of 
domestic manufacturing; yet, exchange rate volatility and financial turmoil will be avoided and 
the system will become stable. This ì will positively affect long-run economic development and 
the relative expansion of manufacturing by providing a more stable and safer context for making 
long-run and often irreversible production and investment decisions. 
[Figure 4] 
 
In spite of a much more stable macroeconomic environment, FDI-induced pressures on exchange 
rate appreciation will continue to jeopardize manufacturing development. In order to effectively 
face this problem, the domestic central bank could intervene on the currency market and avoid 
nominal appreciation by increasing its own foreign reserves. A rise in ?̇? will help to bring the 
isocline for (?̇? = 0) back to its original position or shift it upward in figure 4. The domestic 
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exchange rate could thus remain constant or even depreciate. Perverse effects of FDI on the 
competitiveness of domestic non-traditional tradable sectors will be neutralized or even reverted.  
More generally, we consider an economic scenario in which a FDI-induced surplus in the 
home economy external account initially drives home currency to appreciate. According to Frenkel 
(2007, 2008), this is the context in which the well-known trilemma does not hold true. The 
domestic central bank can thus intervene on the currency market, accumulate foreign reserves, 
maintain an independent monetary policy, and control the exchange rate according to its own 
objectives, even in presence of unfettered capital movements. Domestic monetary authorities 
could be actively involved in fostering the home economy’s long-run development process and 
recognize the importance that the exchange rate plays to favor production and export 
diversification. They could aim at controlling the nominal exchange rate in order to maintain the 
real exchange rate competitive and consistent with domestic industrialization. Such a monetary 
stance largely departs from a strict inflation-targeting monetary policy. Monetary policy should 
pursue a wider range of goals far beyond price stability. One the one hand, the attempt to keep 
inflation under control should be maintained and pursued through a tight coordination between 
monetary, fiscal, and social policies. On the other hand, monetary policy should take a much more 
developmental stand and support domestic production development by targeting an international 
competitive nominal and real exchange rate. Past experience has revealed that exchange rate pegs 
and external nominal anchors are very likely to give rise to speculative attacks and cannot protect 
developing countries from the risks posed to economic development by appreciating real exchange 
rates. Inflation-targeting monetary policy and market-driven exchange rate fluctuations, however, 
seem not to provide a reliable alternative, as exchange rate and macroeconomic volatility can be 
rather high and pressures on nominal and real exchange appreciation will persist. In other words, 
the best BoPs/exchange rate regime seems to be a managed, and sometimes strictly managed, 
exchange rate regime in which domestic monetary authorities target a competitive (and stable) real 
exchange rate in order to favor growth and employment (Ocampo 2013). There is increasing 
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evidence that this kind of policy has proven effective for a number of East Asian countries (Sachs 
1985; Gala 2008; Cimoli et al. 2013). The undesirable long-run effects of FDI-driven Dutch 
disease must be faced and a larger consensus has been reached over that (Ros 2011; Bresser-Pereira 
2012). This paper contributes to provide theoretical support to such positions.      
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Figures 
 
Figure 1 – Joint medium-run cycles in the exchange rate and foreign debt stock 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Fluctuations induced by an initial surge in FDI 
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Figure 3 – Long-run effects of a financial Dutch disease 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 – Short-term capital flow controls and macroeconomic stabilization 
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